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The authors engage in the debate over waste in military force structure planning by rigorously
deconstructing the concept of “redundancy.” First, a typology of redundancy is constructed that
provides a common framework for identifying variety among redundant structures. These are
labeled “true redundancy,” “expanded capacity,” “portfolio diversification,” and “mission
overlap.” Further, a number of mechanisms are identified that produce these types of
structures, and show the conditions under which planners may utilize redundant structure in
the search for optimization. In sum, the article provides refined concepts for analysts and
planners to identify when redundancy is deleterious or beneficial.
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A person performing a redundant task is not contributing to our defense. (Donald Rumsfeld1)
Redundancy is inherently a virtue in war. (Frederick Kagan2)
Introduction
Bureaucracies are complex organizations that are created to execute tasks for some authority. The
US military is one such organization; this bureaucracy is such a massive enterprise that its oper-
ating budget is larger than any other nation’s total budget, and is larger than the gross domestic
product (GDP) of all but a handful of nations.3 It is generally assumed that those who design and
monitor such expensive organizations value efficiency in the execution of tasks and this is, at least
nominally, true of the Department of Defense (DOD). The most prominent reformer of the DOD,
former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, implemented his massive Planning Programming
and Budgeting System in search of such efficiency through “cost effectiveness, elimination of
redundancy, and [improved] process management.”4 It may seem surprising, therefore, to find
advocates of redundancy in military structure, and yet there is vociferous disagreement within
the national security community as to whether redundancy within military structures is beneficial
or deleterious. The authors contribute to this debate by refining the concept of redundancy and
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showing the conditions under which it is optimal. They do so in an effort to improve analysis as
well as policy-making.
On the one hand, critics of redundancy argue that it harms national security because it is was-
teful. If one assumes that resources available to the military are finite, and these are being used to
build an apparatus with superfluous components, then fewer capabilities are being fielded than
might otherwise be the case. These observers might be labeled the advocates of efficiency. This
position was often articulated by former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld:
Transformation of our military forces hinges on being able to reduce redundancy, focus organizations
on executive goals, flatten hierarchies, and cut cycle times in the decision and execution process. If we
can find ways to make real progress in these areas . . . [it] will help drive more effective operational
performance.5
Such a point of view often explicitly or implicitly likens the DOD to a private firm, in which
efficiency leads to survival in competitive markets.
On the other hand, there are those who advocate redundancy in military organizations. These
supporters contend – contra Rumsfeld – that there is a trade-off between efficiency and the like-
lihood of success on the battlefield. They stress that war is a uniquely risky and troublesome
environment, in which normal expectations of performance do not apply; it is far removed
from the world of private firms. Clausewitz labels this phenomenon the “friction” of war: “Every-
thing in war is simple, but even the simplest thing is difficult . . . Action in war is like movement in
a resistant element . . . in war it is difficult for normal efforts to achieve even moderate results.”6
In addition, failure in war, as opposed to failure in other bureaucratic or business enterprises,
may result in the very extinction of the nation state; therefore, the penny-pinching tendencies of
the “bean-counters” should be ignored. Rather, if redundant structures help in successfully
executing tasks on the battlefield, then they are a boon. These observers might be labeled the
advocates of effectiveness. They argue that the military “might not want to rush toward
business-like efficiencies . . . because doing so might endanger effectiveness . . . Military redun-
dancy is not always efficient, but can be effective, since in the peculiar environment of war,
business models are not always best.”7
Under what conditions is either position correct? How are these disparate attitudes toward
redundancy to be reconciled to an observer – or policy-maker? A first step toward resolving
this disagreement is to recognize that there are a variety of concepts trapped within common
usage of the term “redundancy.” A major contribution toward improving policy outcomes is to
unpack the disparate meanings of the term and identify the conditions under which such
redundant structures in a military force structure are deleterious or beneficial and also to identify
multiple sufficient drivers of these various redundancy types within modern military structures.
Some of the mechanisms articulated in this analysis are readily observable, while others are
more abstract in nature – but all represent important factors that may shape policy outcomes.
This is not, however, a claim to present an exhaustive list of sufficient causes of redundancy in
organizational structures, but simply present those most pertinent to modern defense issues. These
include redundancies manifested in research and development, procurement, force structure plan-
ning, as well as actual battlefield military operations. By exploring these issues, this article seeks
to both reconcile the debate over redundancy in military structures as well as assist policy-makers
in creating and monitoring such organizations in time of growing fiscal austerity.8 It should be
noted that the argument presented here is general, yet the author pays particular attention to
the specific case of the USA, both in terms of examples used and recommendations offered.
The analysis starts with a simple set of assumptions. In particular, the executive political
leadership is identified as the actor who determines national security goals, and seeks to build a
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military apparatus for pursuing those goals. Any departure from the pursuit of that stated national
security goal we treat as sub-optimal, without considering the quality of the goal formulation itself.9
These assumptions flow from Clausewitz’s dictum that war is an extension of politics and that
[c]onsequently, the political leadership should ultimately control and direct the conduct of war. That is
not to say that it should displace soldiers in the planning and conduct of operations . . . but the armed
forces do not exist for their own sake. They are an instrument to be used.10
In other words, any deviation from the national security goals as stated by the US President (in his
or her role as Commander-in-Chief) is considered to be pathological, without making any judg-
ment as to the wisdom or worth of those goals. Further, the issue of time is put to one side. In other
words, the inherent inefficiencies introduced by “policy lag,” defined as the “differences in the
planning horizons, budgeting cycles . . . national security strategy development on the one hand
and weapons system/force structure development on the other,” are assumed, with the former
extending only 4–5 years and the latter being closer to 15 years.11 This may result in superfluous
weapons systems, in which “[s]uch purchases are designed to keep the industrial base ‘warm’ and
avoid costly and lengthy reconstitution efforts at a later date or in a national emergency when the
Defense Department needs new equipment quickly.”12 Such a mismatch in planning and
execution timelines introduces many additional wrinkles, which, though important, are not con-
sidered here for the sake of clarity. These assumptions help to limit the scope of our discussion
and allow us to focus solely on the issues at hand.
There are some strong implications of taking the national security goals as fixed. Particularly,
we treat the military budget as a predetermined or a fixed parameter. When dealing with a fixed
budget the military is efficient if it utilizes all its resources in the most productive way. In other
words efficient production implies that expected effectiveness cannot be increased without
increasing resources or improvements in technology.13 In the words of former Assistant Secretary
of Defense, Charles Hitch:
[M]ilitary effectiveness or military worth of any given weapon system cannot logically be considered
in isolation. It must be considered in relation to its cost – and in a world in which resources are
limited, to the alternatives uses to which the resources can be put. Military requirements are meaning-
ful only in terms of benefits to be gained in relation to their cost. Thus, resource costs and military
worth have to be scrutinized together.14
Thus, in a fixed budget context, the effectiveness is maximized by way of efficient use of resources.
To reconcile the use of terms, we will use the term optimal instead of either efficient or effective.
In the following section, a typology of four related, but distinct, organizational structures is
created that is frequently folded under the common usage of the term “redundancy.” The
authors label these: true redundancy, expanded capacity, portfolio diversification, and mission
overlap. Next, the distinction between deleterious and beneficial causes of redundancy in military
structures is established. The deleterious causes of redundancy as coming from bureaucratic inter-
ests, domestic politics, and financial interests are identified, while the beneficial drivers are in
pursuit of optimization in force structure planning. The deleterious sources have commonly
been cited in the literature, while the latter has received much less attention.
In response to this lacuna, considerably more space is taken up discussing how a political leader-
ship might utilize redundancy to pursue an optimal military structure, laying out conditions under
which a reasonable principal might build various types of redundancy into organizational structures.
In conclusion, policy recommendations are offered, identifying the criteria by which either the critics
or advocates of redundancy are correct. Further, practical guidance is proposed to policy-makers to
take advantage of existing redundancies within the military, which might otherwise be wasteful.
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Four types of redundancy
A simple typology of concepts is presented, those which are commonly lumped under the general
rubric “redundancy.” The first dimension of the typology concerns the principal utilizing all of the
output of multiple agents, rather than using only the “highest” or “best” output among multiple
agents. In other words, is the principal only interested in at least one agent achieving some
goal, or can he/she also utilize the production of the second, third, fourth etc. agents as well?
The second dimension of the typology concerns whether agents are identical or differentiated.
In other words, are the agents uniform with one another? Or do they possess distinctive attributes
and tackle the assigned task in a distinctive manner? These two dimensions produce four types
of redundancy, which are labeled: true redundancy, expanded capacity, mission overlap, and
portfolio diversification (see Figure 1 above). Examples are provided for each below.
True redundancy
In true redundancy, multiple identical agents perform identical tasks, and the principal only needs
to utilize the best output among the agents. An example is the parallel structure that is often built
into military communications networks: “Command and control systems . . . need to be robust.
They need to work in a variety of environments . . . In many ways this robustness is well
served by redundancy.”15 The actor only requires the reception of the message content from
any single pathway, even if all others are destroyed or disrupted.
Expanded capacity
In expanded capacity, multiple identical agents perform identical tasks, and the principal can use
the output of all of the agents. This can be thought of simply as increased production. The USA
entered the Second World War with five armored divisions. During the course of the War, the
number of such units was eventually increased to 16.16 These were uniform units, each was
designed to perform identical tasks, the output of which could be simultaneously be utilized by
the principal.
Portfolio diversification
In portfolio diversification, multiple, differentiated agents perform identical tasks, and the princi-
pal utilizes the output of all agents. During the Allied strategic bombing campaign over Germany
in the Second World War, the Luftwaffe invested in two distinct types of air defense: interceptor
fighter aircraft wings and ground-based anti-aircraft battalions (employing the infamous 88 mm
Figure 1. Types of redundancy.
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high-velocity gun). These were units differentiated in their attributes and methods, yet were
designed to perform the same mission (defend German cities from aerial bombing).
Mission overlap
In mission overlap, multiple differentiated agents perform identical tasks, and the principal
utilizes only the highest output among the agents. The US triad of nuclear warhead delivery
systems is an example. Any one of the three systems (manned bombers, submarine launched
ballistic missiles, and ground-based inter-continental ballistic missiles) was designed to deliver
enough destructive power to inflict massive damage to the former Soviet Union, yet each was
designed and deployed with significantly distinct technological and doctrinal attributes.
Distinguishing between deleterious and beneficial redundancy
Given these four types of redundancy, various mechanisms can drive them to emerge in military
force planning: deleterious and beneficial. The sources of these deleterious motivations are ident-
ified briefly below, as they are commonly cited by observers as sources of wasteful redundancy.
By contrast, considerably more space is devoted to the second, under-theorized subject: exploring
how a reasonable principle may use redundancy within the structure of military agents to pursue
policy optimization.
Deleterious redundancy
The common response to the question of redundancy in US military organizations is that it is
pervasive and wasteful. It is common to describe these organizations as Byzantine, self-
serving, and characterized by “overcomplexity, indifference, and obstructionism . . . unnecessary
expenditures, wastage of scarce resources [and] operational redundancy.”17 There are two
oft-cited sources of such wasteful redundancy: the military services themselves, and the external
political and financial stakeholders who benefit from overspending on defense.
The first commonly recognized source of deleterious redundancy is the bureaucratic agent
itself. This argument accords with a well-developed literature on bureaucracy that stems back
to the 1970s. In this vein, bureaucratic managers seek to expand their organization’s overall
budget, their discretionary budget, or their mission.18 In this conceptualization, there exists a stra-
tegic relationship between a political principal and its bureaucratic agent, in which the principal
uses its design, budgeting, and monitoring powers to counter the agent’s use of expertise and
asymmetric information.19 The degree to which the agent succeeds in this struggle depends on
how much it can expand its budget, size, and mission beyond the intention of the political prin-
cipal. The US Air Force’s Thor and the Army’s Jupiter missile programs of the 1950s are
examples of one such redundancy. Both were medium-range ballistic missile programs that, in
the words of one general officer were, “about as alike as the Ford and the Chevrolet.”20 Bureau-
cratic desire for expansion coupled with asymmetric information, therefore, provides a sufficient
condition for deleterious redundancy.
The second most commonly cited source of redundancy is external advocacy. The term “exter-
nal” is used here to denote any actor outside of the bilateral principal–agent relationship between
the executive branch and the military bureaucracy. The most common source of external advocacy
is the “military-industrial complex,” which involves not only the military services mentioned
above, but political and private firm interests as well.21 Politicians desire jobs for their constituents
and corporations want increased profits; the resulting “pork-barrel” relationship among Congress
and defense industry lobbyists is “a fellowship between the service, the contractor and their
patrons in the Congress, and they work very hard not to leave anyone hanging out to dry.”22
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This arrangement can result in redundancy in military structures, even when such redundancy
serves no military purpose – and in some cases may not even be desired by the military forces
upon which the money is being spent.23 Consider, for example, former Commandant of the
Marine Corps Charles Krulack’s lamentations:
I wanted to do away with the Hawk [antiaircraft missile] the second I became commandant . . . Do you
know how long it took me? . . . Four years! . . . There’s a lot of power out there. When you say ‘I’m
going to stop a program’ the military industrial complex rolls in there and says, “No you aren’t.” So
there’s a real problem with industry, with the political side.24
External advocates, therefore, may constitute a sufficient condition for redundancy. General
Krulack sums up the position thus: “Do you remember a guy named Eisenhower? He hit the
problem right on the head.”25
Former Secretary of Defense Gates similarly invoked President Eisenhower and his warnings
concerning such wasteful spending on the military, especially in a new era of fiscal austerity:
“Eisenhower was wary of seeing his beloved republic turn into a muscle-bound, garrison state
– militarily strong, but economically stagnant and strategically insolvent.”26 Gates went on to
define an optimal policy in which Washington “should spend as much as necessary on national
defense – and not one penny more,”27 but implied that the USA is currently overspending on
expensive systems: “for example . . . United States maintains 11 aircraft-carrier strike groups at
a time when no other country has more than one” and he went on to question “whether that
huge advantage amounts to overkill.”28 Simply being aware of this deleterious redundancy
does not, however, ensure that one has the political will to correct it. With regard to the question
of saving $10–$15 billion by scrapping a single aircraft carrier, Gates said, “I may want to change
things, but I am not crazy.”29
Beneficial redundancy
On the one hand, the deleterious side of redundancy is well known. An underexplored source of
bureaucratic redundancy, on the other hand, is that which may be used in pursuit of optimization;
that is, maximizing military effectiveness given some fixed resources. In contrast to the story con-
sidered above, redundancy here results in the most efficient and effective organizational structure.
Five drivers of redundancy in pursuit of optimization are considered here: efficient scale,
probabilistic failure rates, measurement problems, transaction costs, contract enforcement, and
political reliability. The author discusses each of these drivers of redundancy in turn.
Efficient scale
Military organizations are inherently characterized by redundancy. Infantry companies contain
more than one rifleman; armored divisions contain more than one tank. The question that
needs to be answered is: how many riflemen need to be in each company and how many infantry
divisions need to be in the Army? The concept of efficiency of scale allows an analyst to more
rigorously answer this most basic force structure planning question: “how much is enough?”30
A standard definition of minimum efficient scale of production is the size of production unit
that minimizes average cost. This concept can be directly extended to the analysis of military
organization. An alternate definition, specifically applicable to this context, is given a fixed set
of resources; an efficient scale of production is an organization size that maximizes military effec-
tiveness per resource utilized. Hence, the term military effectiveness is an abstract concept, which
can encompass strategic considerations; in other words, effectiveness here includes both force
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structure and the attendant doctrine. In terms of accomplishing some tasks, the efficient scale of
production might vary. Suppose, for example, a task is best done by exactly N different military
personnel in one location. The military might use many teams (say 10) of size N to accomplish a
large task instead of creating one organization of size 10N. In such an example, each of the teams’
outputs is useful to the principal. Thus, the efficient scale argument is only relevant as a cause for
expanded capacity, not true redundancy.
This may seem a straightforward planning task, and yet it can be difficult in an evolving,
dynamic environment:
[J]udgments reflect[ing] the doctrinal capabilities of [units] . . . Only seldom[ly are] sensitive to the
precise size of the division or its constituent units . . . This raises questions such as: Could the division
be smaller? . . . do we still need as many tanks per platoon given the increased range and lethality of
our tanks and modern battlefield surveillance? Could independent combined-arms brigades fulfill
some of the tasks now performed by divisions?31
The US Army, as a stark example, engaged in such a discussion in the 1950s concerning the size
and nature of its divisional unit in the face of tactical nuclear weapons – resulting in the short-
lived “Pentomic Division” structure.32 The appropriate size and structure of US ground forces
is again under debate – rising and falling as beliefs over the impact of changing technology
(Revolution in Military Affairs) and the operational tempo of multiple protracted counterinsur-
gencies (COINs) (as part of the “Global War on Terror”) clash.33
Since all modern armies are hierarchical structures that include multiple undifferentiated units,
this is the most basic question concerning redundancy. In fact, it is so basic as to often be left
implicit in the discussion. An optimizing principal, however, must devote considerable thought
to expanding the capacity of the organization to an appropriate size – both in terms of number
and size of undifferentiated units needed to achieve strategic goals. This efficiency of scale
argument, therefore, drives expanded capacity.
Probabilistic failure rates
Military thinkers and practitioners are understandably concerned about uncertainty that is gener-
ated on the battlefield.34 One way to mitigate uncertainty is through redundant structure; this is the
use of organizational structure to increase the likelihood of success based on the relationship
among success probabilities of parallel mechanisms.35 Redundant forces may serve to mitigate
risk of failure, in a manner akin to the concept of diversification of investments in finance.36
Let us use two simple examples to motivate this discussion. First consider a situation where
identical technologies can be implemented to accomplish a task. The principal only cares if the
task is accomplished or not. If the task is accomplished, then it is of value V. Suppose two
given units have independent probabilities of success p. It costs C to field a unit. If one unit is
used then the expected payoff of the operation is pV 2 C.
On the other hand, consider the use of two independent units. Now only one unit needs to accom-
plish the task to achieve success. At least one unit is successful with probability (2 2 p)p. If two units
are used the expected payoff of the operation is (2 2 p)pV 2 2C. Thus, employment of two units is
better than one if (1 2 p)pV . C, that is, if the cost of implementing a new unit is smaller than the
expected added value of success of the new unit. Suppose a second type of technology becomes
available with the same probability of success, but that is perfectly negatively correlated with the
first. Employing the second unit with this deferent technology would result in the expected payoff
V 2 2C, since the task will now be completed with certainty. This is better than employing a
second unit with an independent failure rate. Using the second unit with negative correlated
success rate is optimal if (1 2 p)V . C.
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One ready example is that of the US military’s ability to destroy enemy armored vehicles.37
US forces have a variety of anti-armor capabilities at their disposal: the 30 mm depleted uranium
rounds from the A-10 ground attack aircraft, precision-guided munitions from other fixed-wing
aircraft, the main gun on a M-1 tank, the TOW missiles affixed to Bradley fighting vehicles,
the Apache helicopter, anti-tank landmines, etc. Each of these weapons systems has distinct
characteristics, even though each has the capacity to accomplish a single mission: destroy
enemy armor vehicles. Further, the production of all of these units can be used additively to
whittle down enemy armor forces – each in its own manner.
Kagan lauded this type of multiplicity of anti-armor capabilities in the 2003 IraqWar “weather
conditions restricted the Air Force’s ability to fly [A-10] sorties against enemy armor concen-
trations. The ability of the [M-1] tanks . . . to survive encounters with those enemy forces
saved American lives.”38 The advantage in employing redundant systems with probabilistic
failure rates, as Kagan notes, is the independence among the rates (or, even better, failure rates
that are negatively correlated) of these systems due to their differing characteristics.
Imagine an armor campaign that stretches from winter to spring: during the winter air mis-
sions may be restricted due to poor weather whereas anti-tank ground forces may continue to
destroy enemy armor, but the spring thaw immobilizes ground units in mud while aircraft may
now resume their anti-armor sorties. In portfolio diversification, a principal weighs the costs of
developing and assigning a variety of distinctive units to the same mission versus simply expand-
ing the capacity of a single type of unit. Additional costs may arise from more research and
development, as well as more complex training and doctrine. Benefit comes from the ability of
some units to continue operating while entire classes of units have been nullified by enemy
action or exogenous forces.
Probabilistic failure rates are a sufficient condition for all four types of redundancy. Most
cases fit under the portfolio diversification or mission overlap, because slightly different forces
are more likely to have negatively correlated failure rates. Mission overlap is similar to true redun-
dancy in that the principal only needs one successful agent, but, as in portfolio diversification, the
differentiation among the characteristics of the agents gives them independent failure rates. An
example would be the deterrent effect provided by US strategic nuclear forces. The US deterred
the Soviets by threatening an unacceptable level of damage through the use of its nuclear arsenal.
The USA did not, however, rely on a single type of delivery system to transport the warheads to
their targets, but rather spread its nuclear bombs among a three-legged “Triad.”39
These three systems were redundant in the respect that:
a force structure entirely of bombers, or ICBMs, or SLBMs could satisfy the [damage] requirement . . .
But the issue of force structure involves building a force which . . . is not highly dependent upon a
single tactic which may be overcome by the enemy over time.40
When making a decision concerning mission overlap, a principal should weigh the cost of buying
additional units versus the resulting marginal increase in the probability of success. Versus true
redundancy (and like portfolio diversification), however, the principal also considers the cost
of developing variety among these units, weighing the additional cost against the likelihood
that enemy strategy or other forces will nullify whole classes of units.
Measurement problems
In a seminal work, Downs argues that the central obstacle to bureaucratic efficiency is the fact that
performance “is not directly or indirectly evaluated in any markets external to the organization by
means of voluntary quid pro quo transactions.”41 In other words, the level and nature of the
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agents’ efforts can be measured against competitors’ in a free market among private firms, while
the quality of bureaucrats’ efforts is largely hidden from the principal. When comparing the
military to other bureaucracies through this lens the problem becomes more intransigent, as
their core function (combat) is further removed from market activity than other bureaucracies
(such as the US Postal Service).42 This is essentially a problem of measurement with which
the principal must contend.
In such a context, creating competition through redundancy can sometimes increase the incen-
tives for agents to take more effective actions. These situations are those where the principal does
not know how to map the agents’ efforts to the expected output; put another way, times in which
the principal is extremely uninformed about agents’ activities. In this case, it is very hard to
measure the agents’ contribution toward the principal’s goals; is it “good” or “bad” based on
the resources used? The principal can solve this measurement problem by creating another
agency and rewarding the agency that does better according to some crude ordinal ranking.
There is a large literature on such incentive problems, which are typically labeled “contests.”43
Based on relative performance evaluations, the principal can use the contest to induce strong
incentives for effective actions, despite the measurement problems. It is possible that over time
measurement issues do not resolve themselves and the principal needs to keep at least two
agencies active in order to evaluate the output of either agency.
This is an optimization-based motivation for pure redundancy, since similarity of the agents
helps resolve the measurement issues. The founding of the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory is an empirical case in point, as it was created as a direct competitor to the Los
Alamos Laboratory in the search for more advanced fusion weapons. When the navy, for
example, sought a small nuclear device with a one-megaton yield for their Polaris missile
program, they discussed it with representatives from both labs. Edward Teller recalled that the
“representatives from Los Alamos said it could not be done . . . But I stood up and said ‘We at
Livermore can deliver it in five years’” and the resulting missile was, indeed, operationally
tested by the USS Ethan Allen in May of 1962.44
When a principal cannot easily measure the agents’ efforts, redundancy may be a remedy. The
redundancy assists the principal by engendering competition among the agents. This is useful
when the principal cannot assess the agents’ work, but can weigh the results of the agents’ activity
against one another. In the case of the nuclear laboratories, the political leadership may not have
had the scientific knowledge to assess the Los Alamos scientists’ claims regarding the difficulty of
the project, but could see the product (a working missile) generated by the competition with the
Livermore scientists. Measurement issues, therefore, may drive true redundancy or expanded
capacity.
Contracting issues
One normally does not think of the various components of a modern military as engaging in con-
tracting amongst one another, and yet it may be useful to do so. In doing so, we present two argu-
ments that deal with issues of coordinating among distinct organizational units. The first, labeled
“transaction costs,” is concerned with the time and effort it takes to negotiate contracts. The
second, labeled “contract enforcement,” refers to the ex post reliability of agreements that are
made among units.
Transaction costs
If two separate military services require that some specific task needs to be handled by a specialist,
then why not employ a single, centralized unit to execute the task across services? Sometimes we
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find this to be the case, and sometimes not. For example, each service provides its own motor pool
services, whereas all of the services contract with a central agency (the National Reconnaissance
Office) to receive satellite imagery. Therefore, when such redundancy (such as multiple motor
pools) exists across units, it can be optimal if the required interactions are so regular and
uniform that internalizing the service is less costly than continually renegotiating with an
outside supplier. This approach to analyzing organizational structure is referred to as transaction
costs.45
Every time either service interacts with the unit terms must be reached for the task to be
accomplished. This is essentially a re-contracting problem studied extensively in the literature
on organization structure and the theory of the firm.46 The cost to constantly re-contract
with an outside body can be substantial enough that each service would prefer to create their
own internal unit to do the task. These redundant components are common across services,
rather than all services contracting with a central repository for such activities, but this is
optimal if it would be too wasteful to constantly re-negotiate these uniform “mini-contracts.”
For example, suppose that the opportunity cost of re-contracting is t . 0, and the service
expects to need to contract k . 0 times in the future. If the cost t × k is greater than the cost
of creating a specialized inter-service unit that will complete the task, then the creation of a
redundant unit is optimal.
There are many ready examples of this in the support functions across services. Each service
has organic motor pools, administrative personnel, food services, laundry, and medical units –
resulting in expanded capacity across services. This may extend beyond mere support activities
and into core combat functions as well. In the 1930s, for example, debates formed about the
proper use of tanks on the battlefield. Heinz Guderian describes the development of his thinking
on this point:
It was principally the books and articles of the Englishmen, Fuller, Liddell Hart, and Martel that
excited my interest . . . These far-sighted soldiers were even then trying to make of the tank something
more than just an infantry support weapon . . . I learned from them the concentration of armour . . . for
long-range strokes, operations against the opposing army’s communications, and also . . . a type of
armored division combining panzer and panzer-infantry units.47
This quote captures the trade-off nicely. One school of thought proposed that tanks be dispersed as
tactical fire-support weapons throughout existing infantry units, integrated with such units and
routinely supplying direct fire on hard targets as an organic function. Others argued that tanks
should be massed in centralized units that could contract with infantry divisions at the operational
level, necessitating the need for tailored re-contracting (combined-arms planning) to be used suc-
cessfully in each campaign.48 In the first school of thought, the redundant tanks across units are
optimal due to the uniformity of routine contracts, while in the second, the complexity and
uniqueness of contracting at the operational level precludes such redundancy. Therefore, in this
argument it is the degree to which contracts are routine and uniform determines whether such
redundancy is optimal.
Contract enforcement
Modern warfare requires careful coordination across various units and various services. Modern
US military parlance uses the term “jointness” to characterize such coordinated inter-unit oper-
ations.49 Each current US military service is such a powerful and complex organization in its
own right, however, that an outside enforcer may not have the acumen or the will to enforce
inter-unit contracts in such operations. Redundancy can be optimal, therefore, if inter-unit con-
tracts are not being honored.50
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For example, service 1 is contracted to do a task for service 2 in particular situations. If service
1 does not find it individually beneficial to do the task at the time it is needed, it will not do it.
Any enforceable contract in this environment can include only weak stipulations on contingent
behavior. An alternate solution is for service 2 to create its own subdivision to handle the task
it currently relies on service 1 to accomplish. As long as the cost creating this internal division
is less than the loss incurred by service 1 not providing the necessary support, it is better for
service 2 to create its own subdivision and avoid the hold-up problem.
The USMarine Corps currently fields roughly 20 squadrons of fixed wing attack aircraft. Why
would this amphibious force require air-to-air combat and ground attack capabilities, when these
should be provided by the US Air Force? Builder argues that this is simply the result of a past
history of broken contracts:
For the Marines the issue is self-reliance, and that means the certainty of their air support. The Marines
never forget a lesson once learned, and one of those lessons was not to trust anyone else to provide
support from the air . . . For the Marines, air support means security from attack from the sky over their
heads, transport through the air, and supporting fire from the air. The Marine Corps will not give up
any of those critical functions and rely on another service to provide them, even if they are assured that
all operations are joint.51
More specifically, this state of affairs arose after perceived failures by Navy and Air Force
(and earlier, Army Air Corp) air assets to prioritize support for Marine ground operations
in the Pacific Theater in World War II and the Korean War.52 Even to this day, Marines
feel strongly on this topic: “the Marine Corps should use [its own air support] so those
strong Marine Corps bonds are there . . . to get a little bit more out of one another when
they’re all in a gunfight because they’re all Marines.”53
In some cases, this redundancy is caused by lack of principal efforts at enforcement. Such
redundancy is optimal for the agent, if it is cheaper to provide its own service rather than risk
broken contracts. Such redundancy is optimal for the principal if the cost of redundancy is
easier to bear than the monitoring costs necessary to enforce contracts between services.
Political reliability
A final sufficient driver of redundant structure in military organization is the problem of political
reliability. This is similar to the probabilistic failure rate problem above, but instead involves the
willful disobedience, or outright mutiny, among politically suspect units.54
To correct political reliability problems, redundant command structures or completely parallel
military structures are sometimes implemented. The Bolsheviks, for example, implanted a politi-
cal commissar command structure within the early Soviet Army: “the commissars were instructed
to take part in all forms of activities of the military specialists and were to . . . countersign all
orders. Only orders so countersigned were to be considered valid.”55 This redundant system
was, however, a trade-off:
Throughout the war, but especially in the 1941–43 period, one crucial issue was never resolved . . .
how the imperative of maintaining tight political control over military commanders and troops
with the attendant diminution of the professional soldier’s authority and freedom of action was to
be reconciled with the equally strong imperative of developing an efficient professional war
machine.56
The needs of political reliability may compel a leader to move beyond redundant command structure
to almost fully parallel military structures. Adolf Hitler, for example, often displayed a profound
336 L.J. Blanken and J.J. Lepore
distrust of the traditional German military (“Wehrmacht”) leadership; Josef Goebbels recorded this
sentiment in his diary in May of 1943: “He is absolutely sick of the generals. He can’t imagine
anything better than having nothing to do with them . . . All generals lie. All generals are disloyal.
All generals are opposed to National Socialism.”57 Hitler mitigated the risk of this politically
unreliable force by creating a parallel and fiercely loyal “army,” the Waffen-SS (the armed wing of
the Nazi party’s paramilitary Schutzstaffel organization); in
June 1941 it only numbered 165,000 men . . . by the end of the war [it was] 700,000 men organized as
separate corps, having 1/5th of the panzer divisions and equaled over 10% of army . . .. [it] also
[included] 200,000 Luftwaffe men, organized as 22 Luftwaffe Field Divisions.58
This force, then, constituted a significant redundant military organization that not only increased
combat capacity on the battlefield, but also provided political buttressing of theWehrmacht forces.
This was increasingly to be the case in the wake of the attempted assassination of Hitler by
senior Wehrmacht generals in the summer of 1944.
Ever since the SS increased its power over the Army so suddenly in July 1944, rumors have persisted
that individual members of theWaffen-SS became attached to regular Army units, especially in the low
echelons, in order to increase the reliability of these troops. The fact that units of the Waffen-SS were
used to prevent mass desertions or withdrawals contrary to orders is established.59
These examples show that political reliability issues may drive a leader to build redundancy into a
military bureaucracy to mitigate risks associated with a military coup, mutiny, or some other form
of willful non-compliance.
Conclusions and recommendations
This article began by citing a recent debate concerning redundancy in military force structure; the
authors now return to it. The position that redundancy should be avoided altogether was expressed
by former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld: “Inefficiency is always unfortunate, but in the Depart-
ment of Defense, it can be deadly . . . A person performing a redundant task is not contributing
to our defense.”60 Such a position reflects a managerial view of the military as a cost-effective
organization akin to a private firm. Other observers reject this position outright.
Frederick Kagan was widely seen as the architect of the Bush Administration’s “surge”
strategy in Iraq. He argues, contra Rumsfeld, that
[r]edundancy in war can yield flexibility and security. It ensures that when one system fails for
whatever unforeseen reason, another can take its place. It provides the ability to meet unexpected
challenges . . . Above all, the US must avoid the search for “efficiency in military matters. Redun-
dancy is inherently a virtue in war.”61
This position harks back to a central tenet of strategic planners, that war is characterized by
uncertainty and therefore planners should err on the side of caution:
Secretaries of defense are expected to argue for a higher DOD budget . . . Ultimately, planning defense
capabilities under uncertainty is deciding how much insurance to buy against unlikely but plausible
events. There is no rigorous and objective means for judging how much insurance is enough . . ..62
This is a serious debate that stands squarely between the Scylla of national security and the
Charybdis of fiscal constraint.
New tools have been provided for adjudicating between the positions of Rumsfeld and Kagan.
Neither is correct that redundancy is inherently good or bad, but it may be wasteful or useful under
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specified conditions. More explicitly, the authors have defined five sufficient conditions under
which a reasonable principal would utilize redundancy to pursue an optimal military organization
(see Figure 2). The first is efficient scale; the authors have helped define the optimal size of
increasing undifferentiated units. Second, they have explored the role of independent probabilis-
tic failure rates, showing how these can justify differentiated redundant units. They have shown
how inducing competition among redundant units can mitigate measurement problems. They
have explored how transaction costs and contract enforcement issues may justify redundancy
across services when contracts for activities are either too costly to be constantly re-negotiated
or contracts that are not being upheld by a third-party enforcer. Finally, problems of political
reliability can justify redundant structures.
This analysis provides a tool for policy-makers, simply by elucidating the various types and
drivers of redundancy in military force structures. Take, for example, the case of special oper-
ations forces (SOF) in the wake of 11 September. As the “global war on terror” began to take
shape, a need was recognized for an expansion of highly trained, independently operating
units capable of both counterterrorism and COIN missions.63 Rather than assigning a single
agency to train and field these forces, however, the US military has SOF units across multiple
services – including Army Special Forces (Green Berets) and Navy Sea, Air and Land Teams.
The most recent addition to the SOF arsenal is the Marine Special Operations Command
(MARSOC), announced by former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in 2005 to
to take on more of the load historically shouldered by other special operations forces (SOF) units . . .
Like our joint United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) counterparts, our mission
typically falls under the following core activities: foreign internal defense, security force assistance,
counterinsurgency, special reconnaissance, and direct action.64
This newly minted SOF force is difficult to justify in terms of optimal use of resources. This is true
for at least three reasons. First, given economy of scale, it would have been far cheaper to simply
expand the capacity of existing SOF units to meet the demand. Second, the existence of “elite”
Figure 2. Drivers of redundancy in military structures.
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forces runs contrary to the ethos of the Marine Corps, as the entire service sees itself as made up of
elite warriors.65 Finally, initial deployments of MARSOC forces to Afghanistan resulted in unfor-
tunate scandal, which was attributed to the “growing pains” of a newly minted unit being
deployed prematurely.66 Given these points, it is easy to make the case that the creation of
MARSOC was an example of deleterious redundancy.
The analysis, however, provides policy-makers an opportunity to utilize MARSOC more effi-
ciently ex post, even though its initial creation was sub-optimal. The core missions assigned to
MARSOC – such as COIN – are exceedingly thorny and complex:
COIN is a complex effort that integrates the full range of civilian and military agencies . . . It is an
extremely difficult undertaking, is often highly controversial politically, involves a series of ambigu-
ous events that are extremely difficult to interpret, and often requires vastly more resources and time
than initially anticipated.67
Based on this assessment, two things are clear. First, there may be disagreement about what is the
best policy to pursue in any given COIN campaign. Second, it is exceedingly difficult for a prin-
cipal to monitor and assess the performance of military agents in a COIN setting.68 In this case,
the principal may utilize MARSOC units in “competition” with existing SOF units in COIN –
ordinal ranking achieved outcomes in lieu of the ability to accurately measure agent progress.
It may further induce MARSOC to develop entirely novel techniques to conduct COIN, utilizing
the logic of independent failure rates among the rival techniques, thereby using portfolio diversi-
fication to “search” for the most successful COIN strategy.
The authors’ analysis, therefore, has made a number of contributions. First, they have pro-
vided a typology of redundancy that will allow for a common framework for labeling various
redundant structures. Second, they have provided a definitional distinction between deleterious
and beneficial redundancies. Third, they have identified a number of common sufficient drivers
of redundancy, many of which allow for planners to utilize redundant structure in the search
for optimization. Finally, they have provided an example of how this logic of optimization can
even be utilized ex post to retrieve some efficiency, even when redundant structures are the
result of deleterious pressures.
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